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bstract
This paper explores the key issues relating to financial sector policies for enterprise development, with special implications for Africa. The role of
he formal financial sector – ranging from microfinance institutions, banks, the capital market, and regulatory agencies – is discussed with respect
o enterprise development at all levels, including start-ups, small and medium firms, and large corporates. Specific policy choices for African
ountries are highlighted, including exploiting the current communications and information technology (CIT) revolution.
 2014 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V.   
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.  Introduction
If there was full information about the creditworthiness of
nterprises, banks would probably not exist. All finance would
e ‘direct finance’, in the sense that lenders would finance enter-
rises directly without the need for banks (Diamond, 1991).
imilarly, there would probably be no need to use money for
ransactions, since borrowing and financing would involve trans-
ers of assets between wealth portfolios. Moreover, the vision
f a world without banks (and money) may be contemplated
n the context of the on-going communications and information
echnology (CIT) revolution. Electronic funds transfer is already
eplacing cheques and giro-based transactions. It is anticipated
hat electronic or digital wallets will replace physical wallets
nd purses containing bank notes and coins. Indeed, the process
s well advanced in Kenya, where the M-Pesa system facilities
ransfer of money using mobile phones, and elsewhere in Africa
Napier, 2011).∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: amullineux@bournemouth.ac.uk (A.W. Mullineux).
eer review under responsibility of Africagrowth Institute.
879-9337 © 2014 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier
.V. 
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rdf.2014.05.001
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Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.However, in most African countries rural enterprises are
mall, such that rural credit is problematic, given the challenge
f delivering financial services to dispersed farming communi-
ies in remote areas. Small urban enterprises also suffer from
financial exclusion’ or credit rationing problems. Unlicensed
oney lenders exploit the opportunity to fill the gap and charge
igh interest rates.
To deal with the rural ‘financial exclusion’ problem, spe-
ial initiatives such as mobile banking units and microfinance
nstitutions (MFIs) have been invoked (Napier, 2011). The most
amous example is the Grameen Bank set up by Yunus (2007).
FIs, along with other mutual financial institutions (e.g. Credit
nions and Community Development Finance Institutions, or
DFIs), have used state-backed loan guarantee schemes to
esolve rural as well as urban ‘financial exclusion’ problems
Mayo et al., 1998). The schemes provide government sub-
idised loan guarantees to reduce banks’ exposure to credit
isk, thereby encouraging greater bank lending to SMEs. It
hould be noted that loan guarantees can be targeted, with dif-
erent levels of risk cover and subsidy, on different sectors of
he economy in pursuit of industrial policy (e.g. encouraging
ending to start-up and ‘growth’ enterprises in high-technology
ectors) and social policy (e.g. lending to businesses led by
omen or particular ethnic groups and lending in deprived urban
reas).
This paper explores financial sector policies for enterprise
evelopment, with reference to Africa. In what follows, the paper
s structured into three sections. Section 2 discusses the role of
he formal financial sector in enterprise development. The policy
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mplications for Africa are highlighted in Section 3, while the
oncluding remarks are presented in Section 4.
.  The  role  of  the  formal  ﬁnancial  sector  in  enterprise
evelopment1
According to corporate finance theory, enterprises finance
heir investment and growth using a combination of internal
nance (retained earnings) and external finance (new equity
ssues, and bank loans or funds raised by issuing debt instru-
ents including bonds).1 Hence, the capital structure of most
nterprises includes retained earnings (internal finance), debt
nd equity (Brealey and Myers, 2002). As enterprises develop,
xternal finance is eventually required to foster faster growth.
nternal finance, however, normally remains the major source
f funding for on-going investment in all firms. Much less
ommonly, because of fear of loss of control; small private
nterprises also accept investment from venture capitalists. This
ypically takes the form of equity investment by individuals
‘business angels’) or through a private equity fund, which
ools the personal wealth of investors. In general, however, as
xplained in Mullineux et al. (2011), enterprises tend to have a
pecking order’ of financing choices; they prefer using internal
nance before they resort to external finance and prefer debt
nance to equity finance.
The overall goal should be to establish a financial system that
llocates capital efficiently on a dynamic basis. To achieve this,
ffective bankruptcy laws are required (Kowalski et al., 2005)
nd the use of capital allocated by the financial sector should be
ontinuously and efficiently monitored. An appropriate balance
etween the rights of creditors and debtors must be struck, so
hat entrepreneurship is not stifled and banks remain willing to
end.
Also, the financial sector plays a key role in corporate gover-
ance. As the allocator of debt and equity finance, the financial
ector is a key stakeholder in enterprise development. It also has
duciary duties to other stakeholders, namely those that have
aved and invested their personal wealth in financial institutions.
he infrastructure required for the efficient operation of a finan-
ial sector includes an effective corporate governance system,
ncluding financial regulation, to ensure that financial institu-
ions manage their risk exposures and discharge their fiduciary
uties appropriately. As the financial sector develops, the impor-
ance of institutional investors (pension and mutual funds and
nsurance companies) tends to increase relative to that of banks
Mullineux, 2011).
In most African economies, banks remain the major source of
xternal capital for both large businesses as well as small enter-
rises, and indeed for the private sector and the economy as a
hole. Debt finance thus tends to dominate equity finance, and
ank debt (loan) finance dominates bond finance because it takes
ime to develop capital markets. Hence, it is important to ensure
hat the banking sector operates efficiently. The potential for
1 We ignore informal financial sector ‘money lenders’ and the ‘shadow’ bank-
ng sector’ (Pozsar and Singh, 2011).
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anking sector instability and its damaging effects have been
llustrated by an ever expanding catalogue of financial crises,
ncluding the Global Financial Crisis (Reinhart and Rogoff,
011). Hence, banks should monitor borrowing firms to ensure
hat the firms use capital efficiently and banking firms should
hemselves be monitored to ensure that they use their capital
nd the deposits they collect, and thus other peoples’ monetary
nd savings balances, efficiently, non-fraudulently, and without
aking excessive risks (Murinde and Mullineux, 1999). There is
ccumulating evidence that banking instability and subsequent
ecapitalisation of banks are expensive in terms of charges on
tate budgets and lost growth (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011). Fur-
hermore, fluctuations in growth and inflation have an impact on
he balance sheets of firms and the asset quality of banks. Bank
upervisors must take this into account (Murinde et al., 2011).
Also discouraging MSME lending, especially to smaller
nterprises, is the ‘fixed cost problem’ (Mayo et al., 1998) that
esults from the fact that the costs of making a loan rise less
han proportionately to the size of the loan and so, to control
osts, bankers prefer to make a smaller number of larger loans,
han a larger number of smaller loans. Smaller enterprises also
ommonly find it difficult to provide ‘collateral’, or security,
gainst loans in order to gain cheaper borrowing rates. Those
ith little or no wealth essentially face ‘financial exclusion’ from
anks and must consider instead the prohibitive borrowing rates
harged by ‘informal lenders’.
Where credit market imperfections exist, credit rationing
aced by MSMEs is commonly addressed using government
ponsored loan guarantee schemes, sometimes with support-
ng business skills training programmes. Financial inclusion, or
ccess to finance, is addressed through the promotion of Com-
unity Development Financial Institutions (www.cdfa.org.uk);
hich provide microfinance in urban areas in the US and the UK
Mayo et al., 1998). Loan guarantee schemes are used to resolve
he risk exposure problem faced by banks. Government backed
unds. Schemes vary in the extent of the guarantee and the degree
f state subsidy and which types of business (classified by size
r nature area of business) qualify. Subsidised insurance premi-
ms are commonly paid by firms in the form of a supplement to
he interest rate charged by the lending banks, which normally
anage the loans. The accumulated premiums rarely cover the
isbursements from the fund resulting from defaults on loans,
nd hence government funding is required. By reducing banks’
isk exposure, it is hoped that banks will be induced to lend
ore than they otherwise would to MSMEs and rely less on
collateral’ and other loan securities.
Schemes such as the UK’s ‘Small Firms Loan Guarantee
cheme’ (SFLG) were introduced on an experimental basis
ith the objective of encouraging banks to engage in and learn
he business of lending to small firms on the basis of pro-
ected cash flows; rather than providing overdrafts and relying
n collateral to secure loans (Cowling, 2010). The amount of
ank lending to SMEs under the SFLG Scheme was sensitive
o the extent of the guarantee, and the take-up by SMEs, not
urprisingly, seemed to be related to the size of the risk pre-
iums charged and hence the degree of subsidy (Mullineux,
994; Cowling, 2010). Failure rates amongst SMEs, especially
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tart-ups, were relatively high (Cowling, 2010). This is in part
ue to the inexperience and lack of training of the managers
nd the difficulty of accessing good advice. Loan guarantee
chemes are thus frequently linked to the provision of pre
nd post finance training and business development advice,
s in the case of the Small Business Administration in the
S.
An alternative to the US and UK models is the German sys-
em, which revolves around the government development banks
KfW) and regional guarantee banks. These are in turn sup-
orted by Chambers of Commerce (Mullineux, 1994; Mullineux
nd Terberger, 2006). The KfW provides implicitly subsidised
edium to long-term loans to SMEs and helps underwrite loan
uarantees extended by the guarantee banks. The implicitly
ubsidy results from the financing of the KfW by government
acked, and thus, relatively cheap, bond issuance. The guaran-
ees are also partially covered by state (Länder) governments.
he German Chambers of Commerce provide expertise to help
creen the loan applications. The originating banks are expected
o screen the loans prior to applying for the guarantee and
o manage the loans where guarantees are agreed. The pro-
ess of screening the loans encourages the development by
anks of expertise in MSME lending, and helps to facilitate
he spread of best practice in screening loan applications by
roviding direct or indirect feedback from experts to banks on
heir screening processes. Thereby, the tendency for banks to
ely too heavily on collateral to secure or underwrite loans is
educed.
Mutual and cooperative banks have emerged in many coun-
ries as vehicles for means of providing finance and education
n money management. Cooperative banks have been formed to
erve agricultural communities in many countries and have been
revalent in France (Crèdit Agricole) and Japan (Norinchukin),
or example. ‘Raiffeisen banks’ emerged in a number of Euro-
ean countries to service the needs of urban craftsmen. Like
heir credit union cousins (Mishkin, 2012, Chapter 12), which
ervice the financial needs of households rather than enterprise,
hese mutually owned banks tend to operate through the pool-
ng of savings for lending to members. In this way, information
roblems are reduced and peer pressure can help assure prompt
nd full repayment of borrowed funds. The original Raiffeisen
anks were essentially urban cooperative banks, or business
redit unions. The general principles of mutuality have also
een applied to insurance and to the housing sector, through UK
uilding societies and US Saving and Loan Associations, for
nstance. The co-operative banking sector is particularly strong
n Germany (Mullineux and Terberger, 2006). Internet based
roup lending schemes amongst households, such as Zopa, and
o firms, such as Thin Cats, have also emerged in the UK recently
Davis, 2012).
An important component of the formal financial sector with
espect to enterprise development is venture capital. Venture cap-
talism involves the provision of equity capital for the start-up
nd development of enterprises (Smith and Smith, 2000; Lerner
t al., 2009). The capital is normally raised from investors in
he form of a fund, which is used to make private equity invest-
ents in business ‘start up’ and early stage growth businesses.
t
i
y
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here is also growth in private equity investment in SMEs by
ich individuals, or ‘business angels’ (Smith and Smith, 2000;
erner et al., 2009; Davis, 2012). The private equity investors
ssentially provide capital to supplement that invested by the
nitial entrepreneurs and normally require, in return, influence
ver the way the businesses is run. Taking on private capital from
utside is thus a big step for MSMEs because it entails dilution
f their control over their enterprises.
It is important to ensure that the tax system is conducive
o the provision of private risk capital, both by insiders
‘entrepreneurs’) and outsiders. It is also important that firms
nd private investors wishing to re-invest profits, rather than
ake them out of their businesses, are given a fiscal incentive to
o so. This may justify setting a capital gains tax at a lower rate
han on profits tax.
To encourage the participation of business angels, access to
nformation on potential clients is also important. A government
usiness support agency, possibly the state development bank,
ould help construct a database to be accessed via the Internet,
or example. There may also be an important role for business
upport agencies in fostering the supply of private equity or
enture capital. Development banks could adopt a market devel-
pment role here, perhaps through co-financing or through a
edicated fund. This is a role which the European Investment
ank (www.eib.org) has recently been assigned. As the venture
apital market becomes established, development banks would
e expected to withdraw after spinning off, or winding down,
ctive funds.
The central bank should encourage banks to share informa-
ion on credit risks in order to reduce the level of bad lending in
he banking system. Increasingly, venture capital funds and busi-
ess angels in more developed economies are looking abroad for
pportunities. The funds are likely to become a growing source
f foreign investment if the tax incentives and legal infrastructure
re conducive and could play a key role in enterprise restructur-
ng programmes. There is a tendency for older and larger venture
apital funds (VCFs), to withdraw from start-up and early-stage
nvestments and to concentrate on investing in growth enter-
rises and ‘high-tech’ sectors. Meanwhile, the focus of Private
quity Funds (PEFs) is increasingly on financing management
buy-outs’ and ‘buy-ins’ (Lerner et al., 2009). Whilst PEFs per-
orm a useful role in the corporate restructuring process and the
nancing of enterprises, a gap in small enterprise equity finance
an emerge. For this reason a sympathetic tax regime should be
etained to encourage ‘business angels’ and new entry into the
enture capital business, including ‘crowd funding’, and a gov-
rnment sponsored development bank that might maintain an
nterest in providing start-up capital, alongside loan guarantees
erhaps, in the medium term.
Just as MSMEs are likely to graduate from being financed
y friends and family and CDFIs, to bank financing; success-
ul ‘growth MSMEs’ will outgrow business angel and venture
und financing. The investors in the VCFs and PEFs will want
o liquidate their investments, take their profit, and re-invest
n the next batch of growth and high-tech SMEs after a few
ears. At this stage, it is common for the private SMEs to
ecome fully public shareholder owned companies. This can
 of De
b
l
I
p
p
s
a
p
t
t
o
t
c
n
h
A
(
t
s
t
F
t
fl
p
c
v
e
r
I
c
b
2
m
m
p
e
a
s
a
a
t
p
r
a
m
g
f
b
p
r
(
c
(
i
M
e
r
t
i
m
1
M
m
C
r
t
r
m
e
c
d
T
b
i
t
a
e
a
l
t
p
s
p
b
n
m
t
t
l
e
r
c
m
U
fl
(
fi
E
2
m
s
t
t
i
‘A.W. Mullineux, V. Murinde / Review
e achieved through ‘stock exchange floatation’s’ (‘initial pub-
ic offerings’, or IPOs) and ‘trade sales’ to larger companies.
POs involve the sale of shares to the general public so that the
rivate capital providers can redeem their investments and take
rofits. They can then reinvest some of the capital by purchasing
hares in the public company. Hence, private equity funding is
ctive in countries with well-developed capital markets that can
rovide the private funders with an ‘exit route’ in the medium
erm.
Another important component of the formal financial sec-
or with respect to enterprise development is the development
f money and capital markets. It should be emphasised that it
akes a considerable amount of time to develop well-functioning
apital markets. A sound regulatory and supervisory framework
eeds to be in place and buyers and sellers in the market will not
ave full confidence or trust in it until it is tried and tested.
s confidence gradually grows, then more and more buyers
investors) and sellers (issuers) of primary securities will come
o the market and its liquidity and stability will increase as a
econdary market develops and holders of portfolios of shares
rade some of their shares. This cannot be achieved by decree.
oreign portfolio investment can help deepen markets if a coun-
ry’s the ‘Capital Account’ has been liberalised, but capital can
ow out as quickly as it flows in, causing large swings in stock
rices. Further, money will not flow in if there is a fear that it
annot be taken out again. Transparency, sound regulation and
igilant supervision are important means of encouraging for-
ign investors to take the additional risks, including exchange
ate risks and political and country risks, of investing overseas.
t is not just financial risks and economic stability that matters,
apital inflows and outflows are as much, if not more, affected
y the level of political stability (Dickinson and Mullineux,
001).
Indeed, there are some lessons which the emerging stock
arkets can learn from the experience of the more developed
arkets, such as the London Stock Exchange, in terms of their
otential for financing enterprises as well as the impact of gov-
rnment intervention in the market (see Green et al., 2000). The
ttractiveness of the shares will of course depend on how well the
tate owned enterprises have been financially and organisation-
lly restructured prior to privatisation. This is as true of banks
s non-financial firms and, as mentioned above, it is important
hat plans are in place to deal with any outstanding bad debt
roblems, or, preferably, that such problem have already been
esolved. The growth of the life insurance sector and the cre-
tion of funded pension schemes will help to ‘deepen’ the capital
arkets by creating a relatively stable demand for equities and
overnment and commercial bonds to satisfy the long-term port-
olio needs of such institutions. Price index-linked government
onds can provide protection against inflation and help disci-
line issuing governments.
The costs of complying with stock exchange registration
equirements may, however, discourage initial public offerings
IPOs) by ‘growth MSMEs’. For this reason, some industrialised
ountries have developed special stock markets, such as AIM
the Alternative Investment Market) in London and NASDAQ
n New York. These are designed to attract IPOs by ‘growth
t
t
b
tvelopment Finance 4 (2014) 66–72 69
SMEs’, which may later hope to graduate to the main stock
xchange. Generally, such exchanges have a lighter regulatory
egime, with reduced reporting requirements that are less costly
o comply with. Such specially designed stock markets increas-
ngly provide the exit route for private investors. As the capital
arkets develop towards the stage reached in the US in the
990s, and by the countries participating in the Economic and
onetary Union in Europe in the 2000s, ‘junk bond’ markets
ay develop. Junk bonds are issued by companies judged by
redit Rating Agencies to be below the ‘investment grade’ credit
isks associated with low risk borrowers; the bonds have rela-
ively higher and uncertain credit risks and offer higher rates of
eturn for investors in compensation.
In the more advanced stages of financial sector develop-
ent, markets in financial derivatives (swaps, options, etc.) may
merge and domestic banks may offer customised ‘over the
ounter’ derivatives (Fabozzi et al., 2010, Part IX). Financial
erivatives facilitate the hedging of risks, as well as speculation.
hey are useful tools for asset and liability risk management
y banks (Casu et al., 2006, Part 3) and other enterprises, but
t is by no means clear that countries should rush to develop
heir own domestic derivative markets, given that they are
ccessible through international financial centres operating with
conomies of scale, and are highly risky. To further facilitate
sset and liability management by banks, the ‘securitisation’ of
oans developed increasingly rapidly in the US and UK during
he 1990s, with mortgage-backed securities (MBS) becoming
articularly prevalent (Fabozzi et al., 2010, Part VIII). Securiti-
ation involves issuing bonds backed by receivables (interest and
rincipal payments) from a package of loans that have already
een originated. Further packaging of MBS into derivatives,
amely Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs), along with the
ispricing of the risks, was at the heart of the ‘subprime crisis’
hat generated the 2008–2009 GFC (Shiller, 2008). Securitisa-
ion consequently fell from favour in the wake of GFC, but it is
ikely to revive when confidence returns.
However, a word of caution is in order. Financial sector lib-
ralisation has been undertaken in order to remove ‘financial
epression’ and hence enhance the role of banks and finan-
ial institution in enterprise development. However, even in the
ost advanced and liberalised financial sectors, including the
S and UK, there remain well documented impediments to the
ow of credit to micro, small and medium sized enterprises
MSMEs) (Mayo et al., 1998). Also, gaps have been identi-
ed in the supply of equity finance to MSMEs (see Bank of
ngland, www.bankofengland.org.uk, OECD, 2006/2007; UN,
009). The major market imperfection is ‘asymmetric infor-
ation’, the implications of which are discussed clearly and
uccinctly in (Mishkin, 2012, Chapter 8). Asymmetric informa-
ion can explain the very existence of banks, and why they need
o be regulated. It also explains why MSMEs face rationing
n the supply of credit, or ‘credit rationing’, as a result of the
adverse selection’ problem. It is costly to collect and process
he information necessary to select the least risky borrowers, or
o ‘screen’ them, and it also costly to ‘monitor’ their use of the
orrowed funds. One response is to ration the supply of credit
o MSMEs (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).
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.  Formal  ﬁnancial  sector  policies  for  SME
evelopment  in  Africa
In many African countries, money transfer systems (MTS),
ased on mobile phone networks, are well advanced and widely
rusted (e.g. M-Pesa in Kenya). With higher grade smart phones
nd networks, a cashless and largely wireless and contactless,
ayment system, akin to the prepayment system piloted at the
ondon 2012 Olympics, could be developed. As information
n credit worthiness is collected, prepayment based systems
ould be replaced by transfers between bank accounts, if the
anks joined forces with the telephone companies (‘telecos’),
nd based on credit from banks.
The mobile phone based payments technology could ‘leap
rog’ the plastic card magnetic stripe, and more expensive, ‘chip
nd pin’ technologies which are currently used for pre-payment
ards, debit cards, charge cards and credit cards, as well as
he use of paper (bank notes and cheques) and coins, which
ould increasingly become redundant. A digital mobile phone
nd computer based payments system would be significantly
heaper than plastic card and paper based systems and would
ncourage commerce by reducing transactions costs. Informa-
ion is the key to developing an efficient financial system based
n ‘e-money’ and ‘e-commerce’. Most important is informa-
ion on credit worthiness. The financial system as a whole will
unction much more effectively if all relevant credit informa-
ion is shared, subject to adequate data protection procedures
o assure confidentiality. National central banks, with the sup-
ort national development banks, with the African Development
ank advising on best practices, would oversee the development
f databases on credit scores.
Financial systems in Africa tend to be dominated by big
anks, with capital (bond and equity) markets at a much ear-
ier stage of development. Insurance products are available, but
gain the insurance markets are not highly developed, especially
s regards re-insurance, and private and company pension’s
rovision is patchy. To facilitate the development of insurance
arkets, sharing of information on insurance risks should also
e encouraged.
Capital markets are used by larger firms to raise debt and
quity through bond and share issuance. The development of
apital markets takes time as it is based on accumulation, through
ublic reporting, of information on companies over time and
he establishment of trust. The supporting structure of financial
nstitutions includes market making, providing advisory services
nd underwriting, broking and fund management. These ser-
ices earn fees, which can be substantial. Fees are also paid
o accountants, auditors, lawyers and other providers of profes-
ional services. Also are the costs of regulation and supervision
o ensure that insider dealing, based on privileged information,
nd fraud, do not result in financial instruments being traded at
anipulated prices.
Microfinance is less well developed in African countries than
n many other emerging markets (Napier, 2011) and rural bank-
ng provision is also patchy. Experiments with rural-cooperative
ased banking have often been less successful than elsewhere.
obile bank branches have been used with some success in
w
avelopment Finance 4 (2014) 66–72
outh Africa, though the aforementioned mobile phone based
echnology could make it redundant if information on credit
orthiness can be collected and shared.
For the banking system to function efficiently, a well func-
ioning wholesale interbank market is essential to enable banks
ith surplus funds can lend them to banks that have greater lend-
ng opportunities. Retail savings banks tend to generate surplus
unds, whilst more commercial lending oriented banks tend to
ave insufficient retail deposits to fund their potentially prof-
table lending opportunities. The national central banks naturally
oster the development of interbank money markets based on
ills issued by the central bank (‘bank bills’) or the government
‘Treasury bills’), because they are necessary for liquidity and
nterest rate control and the stability of the payments system
ased on interbank transfers. As the GFC has demonstrated,
owever, wholesale interbank markets can seize up when banks
ease to trust each other because they are unable to assess ‘coun-
erparty risks’ Information on the credit worthiness of banks, and
elecos, companies, is thus required to underpin the system. This
equires information from credit rating agencies related to their
sset quality, and from prudential supervisors, probably most
redibly and appropriately the national central banks, who assure
heir capital and liquidity adequacy. Once the information shar-
ng requirements are fulfilled, African countries have another
pportunity to leapfrog older and more costly technology.
Given that many African countries are well advanced in
eveloping and using the information based money transfer
echnology that underpins these network based lending and
nvestment systems, there is great potential to use them to pro-
ide financial services to households and MSMEs. In many
ountries, Internet banking has been used successfully to pro-
ide payments services and collect savings deposits too. These
ow transaction cost network-based financial products, services
nd markets must be operated by trusted suppliers, which need
ot necessarily be the traditional banks. A key role of the finan-
ial services suppliers is to collect the necessary information on
he credit standing of the investors and borrowers and any addi-
ional information required for the successful ‘match making’
f lenders and borrowers, and to post accurate and timely infor-
ation on financial instrument prices to facilitate fair trading.
ccess to a credit standing database and diligent data protection
nd appropriate freedom of access to non-confidential informa-
ion is required.
The network-based systems will need to be regulated and
upervised to assure fair pricing and the protection of depositors
nd other savers. There must be careful regulatory screening to
void the emergence of Internet based fraudulent ‘pyramid’ and
Ponzi’ savings and investment schemes, in particular. The non-
eposit taking operators might however expect to be allowed to
perate with less expensive, ‘light touch’, regulation. State inter-
ention will then only be required to fill the financial gaps to deal,
or example, with the subsidised provision of essential financial
ervices, including insurance, to the ‘un-bankable’ poor, and tohich the private sector cannot be expected to finance in full.
There is thus a great opportunity for countries in SSA to take
dvantage of recent electronic digital SSA banking and wider
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ital adequacy requirements and deposit insurance premiums.
Central banks, especially where they have a regulatory and
supervisory role, can guide financial sector development whilstA.W. Mullineux, V. Murinde / Review
nancial systems have embedded within them old fashioned for-
ign banks from former colonial days and newer arrivals, such as
itibank from the US. A number of these banks and other poten-
ial entrants have creaking information technology (IT) systems
n which their problems have been aggravated by mergers with
anks using different IT systems, making integration difficult.
tandard Chartered and HSBC, and indeed Citibank and the
ajor South African banks, such as Standard Bank, FirstRand
ank and the Absa Group, may be different because they have
xperience of managing dispersed international operations.2
frican countries have an opportunity to largely bypass costly
heque clearing systems and cash machine (automated teller
achine, or ATM) networks based on paper technologies, and
lso plastic card based technologies, and to promote cashless,
obile phone network and Internet based, digital money trans-
ission systems. These facilities can be extended to savings
obilisation, lending and credit and equity financing, gaining a
ost advantage over the traditional banking institutions.
If African countries are to be successful in this brave new
ashless and digital finance world, the MTS must be regulated as
 utility to assure, as far as possible; universal access, absence of
onopolistic power, data protection and freedom of information,
nd the reliability of the underpinning IT infrastructure; and
enerally that customers are treated fairly by the providers of
TS and other financial products or services, to ensure trust.
he providers seem likely to include telecos in conjunction with
anks and other financial institutions; including market makers,
rokers, fund managers, and insurers. Those wanting to compete
n the digital financial arena will have to invest in reliable and up
o date IT equipment and governments will have to make sure the
etworks are regulated and supervised. There will also be a need
or well-trained IT operating staff alongside staff well trained
n banking and financial services, lawyers and auditors. Well
rained and competitively remunerated supervisors will also be
equired.
To enable banks to mobilise deposits and underpin bank-
ng stability, funded deposit insurance schemes with risk related
remiums are recommended (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). The
remiums charged to banks need to be related to the riskiness of
he banking assets in which they are invested, so that banks that
nvest deposits in more risky assets, pay more for their insurance.
ffectively, risk taking is taxed, as long as the premiums are paid
p front into a fund; which can be used to finance the ‘resolution’
f failing banks and thus to protect the taxpayer. Flat rate, non-
isk related, premiums based schemes encourage banks to game
he system by taking more risks than they are paying to have
nsured, at the expense of others. Such banks have an incentive
o pay higher interest than competitors to attract depositors, cre-
ting an adverse selection problem. Unfunded schemes, which
re generally preferred by big banks who claim they will never
2 In 2012, IT based payments system failures in the UK at RBS (NatWest Bank
nd Ulster Bank) and Nationwide, a large nationally networked building society,
emonstrated the costly operational and reputational risks banks face through
ismanagement of IT based money transmission systems (MTS). However,
here were also significant ‘outages’ due to IT system failures, at the UK teleco
perators O2 and at Orange, and at ‘BlackBerry’ in the UK in 2012.
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raw on the scheme because they are ‘too big (to be allowed)
o fail’ (TBTF), are unlikely to work since, when the ‘hat’ is
assed round, the ‘good’ banks are likely to complain that they
annot afford to contribute and that the system it is unfair. TBTF,
r strategically important, banks should either be broken up, so
hey are no longer TBTF, or forced to pay for their implicit insur-
nce by taxpayers; by contributing to the deposit insurance fund,
nd also through holding supplementary capital, as proposed by
he Basle Committee on Banking Supervision and the Financial
tability Board.
To stimulate traditional bank lending to MSMEs, loan guar-
ntee schemes are widely used in developing country and
ecommended for Africa. The existing provision of loan guaran-
ees in Africa is generally through national development banks
nd, is patchy. Policy leadership often comes from multinational
nstitutions, such as the World Bank and the ADB. In devel-
ped countries success with loan guarantee scheme is mixed.
ermany, through KfW, its development bank, and the US,
hrough the Small Business Administration, provides exam-
les of good practice, but the UK experience has been mixed.
owling (2010) evaluated the long running Small Firms Loan
uarantee Scheme (SFLGS), which has been succeeded by a
apid succession of new initiatives since the onset of the credit
runch in 2008. There has been insufficient time for these to
ecome embedded and seriously evaluated.3
.  Concluding  remarks
In conclusion, African countries have a wide range of
nancial sector policies to engender and sustain enterprise devel-
pment. We highlight the key options below.
Government intervention, in the form of regulation and super-
ision of the wider financial sector and in the provision of
unded and risk related deposit insurance and loan guarantees
nd other MSME business support services, is necessary to coun-
eract market failures caused by information asymmetry and
xed-cost problems in African countries. However, market-led
financial reforms’, with the pace financial innovation regu-
ated, but making full use of the latest mobile phone network
nd Internet technologies, are the key to the evolution of the
nancial sector and enterprise development. The private sector
hould be brought into partnership with the government to assure
idespread access to finance and markets should be conditioned
y ‘incentive compatible’ solutions, including risk-related cap-3 Lessons from the UK (Cowling, 2010; Mullineux, 1994) are that banks
enerally find the scheme cumbersome and do not want to bother with the
aperwork and SMEs are put off by having to pay a high premium for insured
oans. The higher the guarantee to the banks offered by the scheme, the more the
anks use it, the lower the premium and thus the greater government subsidy,
he more SMEs want to use it. The government of Japan has varied its multiple
oan guarantee schemes to stimulate bank lending to SMEs since the collapse
f the Japanese ‘bubble economy’ (Bayoumi and Collyns, 2000) in 1990, and
gain in response to the GFC. Its experience is reviewed by Nishada (2010).
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ttempting to control inflation and maintain financial stability.
ational and multilateral development banks can help fill financ-
ng gaps resulting from market failures until they can be plugged
hrough financial sector development. The development banks
an also help with the financing of infrastructural development,
ut should progressively withdraw as the financing gaps are
losed and as bond and equity markets develop.
Banks should continue to play a leading role in promot-
ng the growth of enterprises, especially the MSMEs, and
ond and equity markets will become increasingly important
or larger firms in emerging market economies. However, the
mportant role played by mobile phone networks in Africa’s pay-
ents systems, such as M-Pesa in Kenya, suggests that there
s likely to be a strong symbiosis between banks and telecos
uilt around network-based phone and computing technologies
Napier, 2011). Davis (2012) provides a review of what is already
eing achieved in the UK by Internet based technologies in
ircumventing banks in business lending and equity finances.
nformation on credit worthiness and digital technology, rather
han cheques and paper money, and plastic cards hitherto domi-
ated by traditional banks, underpin these financial innovations.
f the banks in Africa want to grow, they should consider joining
orces with telecos and adapt their mode of doing business.
Pending the development of domestic capital markets, or
ccess to international capital markets, development banking
ill remain important for funding long-term investment and
nfrastructural projects. Developing country governments will
lso continue to use development banks to tap into inter-
ational capital flows by offering co-financing prior to the
evelopment of fully fledged capital markets. The national
evelopment bank, or some other agency, should also develop
oan guarantee schemes and provide training and other services
o managers in the MSME sector. In other words, development
anks should focus on addressing market failures. As the market
ailure in the provision of long-term capital to larger enterprises
eclines in importance, because access to capital market financ-
ng increases, the development and commercial banks should
ncreasingly focus on meeting the needs of MSMEs, for it is
SMEs that will be the engine for future development. It seems
ikely that the banks will increasingly operate in partnership
ith telecos, which already have a strong and growing foothold
n payments systems in Africa.
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